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Abstract
A quantum cryptosystem is proposed using single-photon states with different frequency spectra
as information carriers. A possible experimental implementation of the cryptosystem is discussed.
1. Introduction
The idea of quantum cryptography was first proposed in Ref.[1], initially inaccessible. In its current
form the protocol for propagation of a key (a secret random sequence of zeros and ones) was proposed
in Ref. [2]. A new qualitative jump in the understanding of secrecy in quantum cryptography arose
after Ref. [3], in which a protocol was proposed for exchange using nonorthogonal states, and Ref. [4]
where a protocol was described using the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen effect.
Various versions of cryptosystems using nonorthogonal states and the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen
effect were proposed subsequently.[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]
Experimental prototypes of quantum cryptosystems have been implemented using nonorthogonal po-
larization states of photons for coding[5, 11, 12] and also using the principle of phase coding based on
a fiber-optic Mach–Zehnder time-division interferometer [8, 9, 10, 19] (an improved version of the sys-
tem from Ref. [10] was implemented in Ref. [19]). The longest communication channel achieved under
laboratory conditions is 30 km (Ref. [10]). The operation of a prototype quantum cryptosystem has
been demonstrated under natural conditions using a 23 km long optical cable below Lake Geneva[18]
and also between various buildings at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.[13]
Most of these systems use the interference principle which roughly involves “splitting” a photon at
the transmitting end of the line and “collimating” it at the receiving end. Here we propose a quantum
cryptosystem using different photon frequency states which utilizes the “internal interference” of the
different photon frequency components. Such a system may well prove more stable in operation
than direct interference systems although this can only be confirmed by means of an experimental
implementation.
The secrecy of the key in quantum cryptography is based on two facts: 1) the impossibility of coding
(cloning) a previously unknown quantum state [23] and 2) the impossibility of extracting information
on quantum states without perturbing them if they belong to a nonorthogonal basis.[3] Formally, any
pair of nonorthogonal states corresponding to logic 0 and 1 can be used as information carriers. The
detection procedure (quantum-mechanical measurement) at the receiving end should be set up such
that any attempts at intervention within the communication channel, i.e., changes in states, can be
identified from the results of the measurements. If the pair of nonorthogonal states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are
used as carriers, the formal measurements are given by the projectors[3]
E0 = 1− |ψ0〉〈ψ0|, E1 = 1− |ψ1〉〈ψ1|,
whose action reduces to the projection of states orthogonal to the vectors |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, respectively,
on the subspaces.[3] The result of the action of the projectors is treated as a statement and the
probability of the measurement results is given by the expressions:
Pr = Tr{ρˆ0E0} = Tr{ρˆ1E1} ≡ 0,
Pr = Tr{ρˆ0E1} = Tr{ρˆ1E0} = 1− |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2 6= 0. (1)
Measurements using E0 and E1 in an ideal communication channel (without noise) can detect any
attempts at eavesdropping, i.e., changes in states. The first nonzero outcome of a control measurement
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definitely indicates the presence of an eavesdropper. When it is known that a signal, say |ψ0〉, was sent,
measurements were made using E0, and a nonzero result obtained, the nonzero result is considered to
be a statement that the state E0 has a nonzero component in the corresponding orthogonal complement
of the Hilbert space (i.e., that the state |ψ0〉 was changed).
Photon states are used as information carriers for real fiber-optic communication channels. For-
mally any pair of nonorthogonal photon states can be used (not necessarily even single-photon states).
However, it is unclear how the measurement procedure corresponding to the projectors E0,1 for a given
pair of states can be implemented experimentally. It would be easiest to use a pair of nonorthogonal
polarizations but an optical fiber does not “support” polarization (see details given in Refs. [11] and
[12]). The prototypes of quantum cryptosystems mentioned use the phase coding principle based on
time-division interferometer.[8, 9, 10] After the interferometer has been operating for a few minutes,
the system requires additional alignment.[10]
2. Cryptography using photon “frequency” states
A quantum cryptographic system using the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen effect for a biphoton field was
proposed in an earlier study[20] and this idea is developed here. Subsequently, the use of frequency
states which do not use interference over large distances is suggested. Let us first analyze a formal
system and then discuss an experimental realization. Three single-photon states are used as carriers:
two information states corresponding to logic zero and one and one control state. The information
states are mutually orthogonal. The control state is pairwise nonorthogonal to the information states.
The use of only two information states is inadequate for secrecy because they can be reliably distin-
guished as a result of their orthogonality. The information states comprise pure stationary states with
the density matrices
ρˆ0 = |e0〉〈e0|, ρˆ1 = |e1〉〈e1|, 〈e1|e0〉 = 0, (2)
where |e0〉 and |e1〉 are certain basis states assigned to the energies ω0 and ω1, respectively. The
control state is nonstationary and contains both basis components |e0〉 and |e1〉:
|ψc(t0)〉 = e−iω0t0f0|e0〉+ e−iω1t0f1|e1〉,
ρˆc(t0) = |ψc(t0)〉〈ψc(t0)|, (3)
and the normalization condition
|f0|2 + |f1|2 = 1.
The time t0 describes the beginning of the time measurement — the state preparation time (see
below). The density matrix at times t > t0 is obtained by substituting into the argument ρˆc(t) =
|ψc(t − t0)〉〈ψc(t − t0)|. The introduction of two orthogonal information states reduces the number
of “idle” outcomes because of their distinguishability if no eavesdropping is detected in the exchange
process. This scheme uses two types of measurements. The measurements of the frequency spectrum
are described by an orthogonal resolution of identity in space spanned on states |e0〉, |e1〉:
E0 + E1 = I, E0 = |e0〉〈e0|, E1 = |e1〉〈e1|, (4)
where I is the unit operator. The second family of measurements involves measuring the time and is
given by a nonorthogonal resolution of identity (see Ref. [24], for example), which in our case has the
form
T∫
0
E(dt) = I, T =
2pi
|ω1 − ω0| ,
E(dt) =
(
e−iω0t|e0〉+ e−iω1t|e1〉
) (
〈e0|eiω0t + 〈e1|eiω1t
) dt
T
. (5)
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In accordance with the general philosophy of quantum-mechanical measurements, the measure-
ments were made at a certain time.[24, 25, 26] The probability of the outcome of the measurements
using the projectors E0 and E1 does not depend on time and is given by
Pr = Tr{ρˆ0E0} = 1, Pr = Tr{ρˆ1E1} = 1, Pr = Tr{ρˆ0,1E1,0} ≡ 0,
Pr = Tr{ρˆc(t)E0} = |f0|2, Pr = Tr{ρˆc(t)E1} = |f1|2. (6)
Measurements of the time give the probability distribution of the outcomes in the range (t, t+ dt):
Pr(dt) = Tr{ρˆ0,1E(dt)} = 1 · dt
T
, (7)
Pr(dt) = Tr{ρˆc(t)E(dt)} = |f0 exp [−iω0(t− t0)] + f1 exp [−iω1(t− t0)]|2
(
dt
T
)
=
= {1 + 2Re [f0f∗1 exp [−i(ω0 − ω1)(t− t0)]]}
(
dt
T
)
. (8)
For the control state the probability is an oscillating function with the period T = 2pi/|ω1 − ω0|.
This set of measurements can completely reconstruct information on the states — no other density
matrices can reproduce the statistics of the measurements so that any attempts at eavesdropping can
be detected (for further details see Ref. [22]).
The key generation protocol is as follows. We assume that all the parameters of the states are
known to everybody, including any potential eavesdropper. User A (henceforth “Alice”) randomly
sends into the communication channel states ρˆc, ρˆ0, or ρˆ1. User B (henceforth “Bob”) randomly
and independently of Alice selects measurement type E0, E1, or E(dt). After making a series of
measurements, Alice transmits through the open channel (accessible to all including an eavesdropper
—“Eve”) the numbers of some measurements when ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 were sent and all the numbers when
control state ρˆc was sent. Bob sorts the measurements into three groups according to when ρˆc, ρˆ0,
or ρˆ1 were transmitted. In each of these three groups, three subgroups are identified according to
measurement procedures E0, E1, or E(dt). For instance, for those messages when Alice transmitted
state ρˆc, the relative fraction of the measurement outcomes when the projectors E0 and E1 were used
should be |f0|2/|f1|2 regardless of the measurement time. For the E(dt) measurements the probability
of the measurement results at various times should converge toward the probability distribution (8).
The convergence of the distribution function for a finite sample should by checked by using some
statistical criterion such as the Kolmogorov criterion[27] (see also Ref. [22]). The convergence is
checked similarly for the measurements when states ρˆ0 or ρˆ1 were sent.
For example, for state ρˆ0 the measurements using E0 should give the same outcome in all attempts,
which does not depend on the measurement time. For the E1 measurements in all attempts the out-
come should be zero regardless of the measurement time. For the E(dt) measurements the probability
of the outcome is only determined by the duration of the time interval dt and does not depend on the
time t.
The secrecy of the protocol is guaranteed by the nonorthogonality of the information states to the
control state and by the fact that a set of measurements is information-complete so that any attempts
at eavesdropping, i.e., changes in states, can be detected. In other words, no other density matrices
can reproduce the statistics of the measurements at the receiving end (for further details see Ref. [22]).
After having established that no eavesdropping is taking place, Alice transmits the numbers of
those measurements when the control state was sent. All the idle measurements when the detector
was not triggered are discarded. Then, for the remaining numbers Bob only transmits the numbers
of those measurements in which he used E0 or E1 but does not communicate which measurement, E0
or E1, was used in each specific attempt (this information is now known only to Alice and Bob).
These remaining measurements give the secret key (an identical random sequence of zeros and
ones for Alice and Bob).
We shall illustrate why an eavesdropper will inevitably introduce errors. In order to obtain infor-
mation on the key, Eve must distinguish states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1. To do this, she must make measurements
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with a narrow-band detector (measurements of E0 or E1). If there were no control state ρˆc containing
both spectral components with frequencies ω0 and ω1, as a result of the mutual orthogonality of the
information states, it would be possible to determine uniquely which state is present in the line. How-
ever, their nonorthogonality to the control state will inevitably lead to errors since there will always be
measurements with an undetermined result. For instance, if ρˆc is present in the line and Eve measured
E0 and obtained a nonzero result, it is impossible to uniquely determine which state, ρˆc or ρˆ0, gave
this result Resending ρˆ0 instead of the true state ρˆc leads to a change in Bob’s measurement statistics.
It is also impossible to discern in one measurement that both spectral components with energies ω0
and ω1 are present simultaneously in a state because of the orthogonality of the components since
this requires measurements by means of E0E1. This projector can be considered as confirmation that
the property E0 (ω0 present) and E1 (ω1 present) are found simultaneously. However because of the
orthogonality (E0
⋂
E1 = ⊘) the action of E0E1 on any density matrix has a result identically equal
to zero. Also no unique information can be obtained on the simultaneous presence of spectral compo-
nents using more general (non-von Neumann) measurements, which is guaranteed by the theorem in
Ref. [3].
3. Possible implementation of a cryptosystem
We shall now discuss a possible experimental implementation in which the carriers are three single-
photon states of the type
|1ω0〉 = a+ǫ,ω0 |0〉, |1ω1〉 = a+ǫ,ω1 |0〉,
|1c〉 = f0e−iω0t0a+ǫ,ω0 |0〉+ f1e−iω1t0a+ǫ,ω1 |0〉 (9)
with the corresponding density matrices
ρˆ0,1 = |1ω0,1〉〈1ω0,1 |, ρˆc = |1c〉〈1c|,
where a+
ǫ,ωi
is the creation operator of a Fock monochromatic state with the frequency ωi (i, 1) and
polarization ǫ, and |0〉 is the vacuum state. Quite clearly, a strictly monochromatic state is an
idealization. However, there are no fundamental constraints on the formation of states arbitrarily
close to monochromatic.
The measurement procedures described above may be implemented by using a fast (fairly wide-
band) photodetector operated in a waiting regime, and two narrow-band filters at frequencies ω0
and ω1. from standard photodetection theory,[28] the detection probability is proportional to the
first-order correlation function of the field
Γ(1)(t) = Tr
{
ρˆiEˆ
(−)(x, t)Eˆ(+)(x, t)
}
, (10)
where
Eˆ(+)(x, t) = i
∑
ωn
√
h¯ωn
2V
aǫn,ωn exp(−iωnt+ iknx),
Eˆ(−)(x, t) = −i
∑
ωn
√
h¯ωn
2V
a+
ǫn,ωn
exp(iωnt− iknx),
and V is the normalization volume. At this stage it is more convenient to use a formal normalization
of the states in a finite volume (see below). We can even use unnormalized states. With this defi-
nition the probabilities of the measurement outcomes will also be unnormalized, but since only the
relative probability is important for the different measurements, this lack of normalization is unim-
portant. Measurements of the correlation function of the field (the instantaneous intensity) Γ(1)(t)
are a realization of the E0,1 and E(dt) measurements described above in the sense that the statistics
of the outcomes gives the same information on the states as the statistics of the E0,1 and E(dt) mea-
surements. A combination of measurements using a fast photodetector and measurements using two
narrow-band filters and the same photodetector can provide information on the amplitude |f0,1| and
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relative phase of the components f0 and f1, which exhausts the information on the states (see also
Ref. [22]).
The probability p of a photon being recorded in the time interval (t, t+dt) by an ideal photodetector
is proportional to the field intensity I(t) ∝ Γ(1)(t) (Ref. [28]):
p(t)dt ∝ I(t)dt = Γ(1)(t)dt. (11)
If the photodetector trigger time is τdet ≪ 1/|ω1 − ω0|, this photodetector implements E(dt) mea-
surements in the sense indicated above. It can be seen from Eq. (10) that for state (9) the recording
probability with allowance for Eqs. (9)–(11) has the form
p(t)dt ∝ I(t)dt = Γ(1)(t)dt =
∣∣∣∣√ω0f0 exp
[
−iω0(t− t0) + ik0L
c
]
+
+
√
ω1f1 exp
[
−iω1(t− t0) + ik1L
c
]∣∣∣∣
2 dt
2V
, (12)
where k0,1 are the wave vectors corresponding to the frequencies ω0,1 and L is the length of the com-
munication channel (we assume that the measurement is made at a distance L from the transmitting
end).
Measurements of the amplitude of the spectral components f0,1 are made using a pair of narrow-
band filters which cut out the frequencies ω0,1 prior to photodetection, and the same photodetector.
The recording probability, in accordance with Eqs. (9)–(11), does not depend on time:
pc(t)dt ∝ Γ(1)(t)dt =


h¯ω0
V
|f0|2dt, E0 measured,
h¯ω1
V
|f1|2dt, E1 measured,
p0,1(t)dt ∝ Γ(1)(t)dt =


h¯ω0
V
× 1 dt, E0 measured for ρˆ0,
0 E1 measured for ρˆ0,
h¯ω1
V
× 1 dt, E1 measured for ρˆ1,
0 E0 measured for ρˆ1.
(13)
A qualitative version of a cryptosystem is shown in Fig.1. Before entering the line, the signal from
a single-photon source is expanded into a spectrum from which are cut either one of the frequencies
(ω0 or ω1), or both spectral components with the frequencies ω0 and ω1. The E(dt) measurements are
made using a fast photodetector operating in a waiting mode. In this mode the occurrence of an event
(its recording) will take place at a random time, not chosen by the experimentalist. This differs from
the E(dt) measurements made at a time preselected by the experimentalist in the range (t, t + dt);
the probability of recording at this time is described by the density pc(t). In this case, the E(dt)
measurement cannot be understood as a measurement by the fast photodetector which has an input
diaphragm in front of it which is opened in the interval (t, t+ dt). This procedure also corresponds to
some measurement, but not to an E(dt) measurement. The integrated recording probability at time
T is given by
P (T ) =
T∫
dt pi(t), i = c, 0, 1,
from which the probability density in the time interval (t, t + dt) can be obtained by differentiating
with respect to the upper limit. The E(dt) measurement essentially contains information on the
“interference” of the different spectral component within a single quantum state (information on the
relative phase of the components with the frequencies ω0 and ω1). Thus, it is fundamentally important
that in different messages the state ρˆc is prepared so that the relative phase of the spectral components
is the same. Otherwise, the time-oscillating (interference) component with the frequency ω1 − ω0 in
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the probability pc(t) will not be reproduced at the same times in different attempts. The problem of
preparing a single-photon state where the relative phase of the components is fixed can be solved as
follows. Let us assume that a two-level system exists with a spin-nondegenerate electron spectrum
(for example, a quantum dot with Coulomb interaction, see details given in Ref. [29]).
Resonant illumination with a square-wave pulse can transfer the system to the excited (quasi-
steady) state. We shall assume that the duration of the square-wave pulse is much shorter than the
radiative recombination time (τpi ≪ τR). The duration of the square-wave pulse can be made substan-
tially shorter than τR with some margin for not impairing the condition of resonant illumination.[29]
This implies that the time of excitation t0 is determined to within ∼ τpi ≪ τR. After the square-wave
pulse has been switched off, the free evolution of the system comprising an electron in the excited
state plus the electromagnetic field in the vacuum state leads to recombination of the electron and
the appearance of a single-photon packet with the characteristic spectral width ∆ω ≈ 1/τR. The
single-photon packet is defined as[30, 31]
|1f 〉 =
∑
k
fka
+
ωk
|0〉,
∑
k
|fk|2 = 1. (14)
The average number of photons in the packet is
n = 〈1f |a+ωkaωk |1f 〉 = 1, (15)
and physically this implies that recording by an ideal wide-band photodetector (which captures all the
spectral components) leads to triggering with a probability of unity. Recording by an ideal narrow-
band detector at the frequency ωn leads to a probability |fn|2 < 1 of triggering.
Since each system at time t0 starts from the same state, in different messages the single-photon
packets are the same (the phase of all the spectral components determined by the factors exp(−iωit0)
is the same in different messages). Cutting out two narrow spectral components from the spectrum
conserves their relative phase. In fact, the cutting of the spectral components is formally described as
the action of the projector1
E0 + E1 = (|1ω0〉〈1ω0 |+ |1ω1〉〈1ω1 |),
after which the density matrix of the single-photon wave packet is transferred to a new state (see
Refs. [25, 26], and [32])
ρˆin(t) =
{∑
k
exp [−iωk(t− t0)] fk|1ωk〉
}
×
×
{∑
k′
〈1ω′
k
|f∗k′ exp
[
iω′k(t− t0)
]}→ 1
Tr {ρˆin(t)(E0 +E1)} (E0 + E1)×
×
{∑
k
exp [−iωk(t− t0)] fk|1ωk〉
}{∑
k′
〈1ω′
k
|f∗k′ exp
[
iω′k(t− t0)
]}
(E0 + E1)→
→ 1|f0|2 + |f1|2 {exp [−iω0(t− t0)] f0|1ω0〉+ exp [−iω1(t− t0)] f1|1ω1〉} ×
× {〈1ω0 |f∗0 exp [iω0(t− t0)] + 〈1ω1 |f∗1 exp [iω1(t− t0)]} . (16)
Physically this implies that if an ideal wide-band photodetector is placed after the filters, in a large
number of repeated tests it will only be actuated in the fraction Tr {ρˆin(t)(E0 + E1)} of the total
number of cases.
The relative phase of the components with frequencies ω0 and ω1 is determined by their phase
at the preparation time which is attainable in principle, as described above. Thus, provided that
τpi ≪ τR ≪ 1/|ω1−ω0| we can assume that in different messages the temporal interference pattern stays
1Strictly speaking, an ideal filter corresponds to a projector on the subspace of states with frequencies ω0, ω1 and all
the occupation numbers Eω0 + Eω1 =
∞∑
n=0
(|nω0〉〈nω0 | + |nω1 〉〈nω1 |〉), but this does not alter the results.
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in place. In different messages the interference pattern only “floats” to the extent of the inaccuracy
of the initial preparation time δt0 by the amount δt0 ≤ τpi ≪ T = 2pi/|ω1 − ω0| which is substantially
less than the period of the temporal interference pattern.
Assuming that the square-wave pulse duration is τpi ∼ 10−12 s (see Ref. [29]) and the radiative
recombination time τR ∼ 10−10 s (in this case the spectral width of the initial single-photon state
is ∆ω ∼ 1010 Hz), and spectral components of width σ ≈ 107 Hz separated by the distance δω =
|ω1 − ω0| ∼ 108 Hz are cut out (which is still very far from the limits now attainable), the required
photodetector response speed is satisfied for τdet ∼ 10−9 s. The chain of inequalities τpi ≪ τR ≪
τdet ≪ 1/δω is then satisfied with some margin. The efficiency as a result of cutting out narrow
spectral components of width σ ∼ 107Hz from a spectrum of width ∆ω ∼ 1010 Hz is ∼ σ/∆ω ∼ 10−3.
However, at least the problem of a strictly single-photon source can be solved in principle. We
shall estimate the accuracy in fixing the length of the communication channel. Changes in the length
of the fiber-optic line also lead to blurring of the interference pattern as a result of the presence of
terms with k0,1L in the exponent in formula (12). The changes in the relative phase of the spectral
components as a result of variation of the line length δL should satisfy the condition
|k1 − k0|δL ≈ |ω1 − ω0|δL/c≪ 2pi,
and permissible variations of the line length should lead to a relative phase shift much less than 2pi.
This gives the estimate
δL≪ 2pic/δω ≈ 102 cm,
which is a fairly soft condition.
The interference pattern may also become blurred as a result of the polarization vector rotating at
different speeds in the different frequency components. However, if the position of the cable is fixed,
the interference pattern may be precalibrated. In this case, any changes will only be attributed to the
different optical paths of the frequency components, i.e., variation of the line length. This condition
is clearly noncritical. The frequency dispersion of the dielectric constant of the optical fiber can also
lead to smoothing of the amplitude of the oscillations of the interference pattern. The longer the line,
the stronger this smoothing. However, estimates[21] show that if the width of the spectral components
is σ ≈ 107Hz, the dispersion has an influence at far greater lengths than the attenuation.
Attenuation does not influence the secrecy of the system and only reduces its efficiency by increasing
the fraction of idle measurements.
The states with infinitely narrow spectral components analyzed above are an idealization and are
unsuitable for transmission along a communication channel because of their formally infinite duration.
In real experiments we can only prepare states with a finite line width (the preparation of strictly
monochromatic photon states would require a formally infinite time). The information states can be
single-photon states of the type (14) with Gaussian spectral densities
|1ω0,1,c〉 =
∞∫
0
f0,1,c(ω)a
+(ω)|0〉, [a(ω), a+(ω′)] = δ(ω − ω′)Iˆ , (17)
E(+)(x, t) =
1√
2pi
∞∫
0
exp
[
−iω
(
t− x
c
)]
a(ω)dω, (18)
f0,1(ω) =
1
(2piσ2)1/4
exp
[
−(ω − ω0,1)
2
4σ2
]
exp(−iωt0) (19)
and a control state containing both narrow-band Gaussian components with amplitudes f0 and f1:
fc(ω) =
const
(2piσ2)1/4
{
f0 exp
[
−(ω − ω0)
2
4σ2
]
+ f1 exp
[
−(ω − ω1)
2
4σ2
]}
exp(−iωt0), (20)
where the normalization constant is
const =
{
|f0|2 + |f1|2 +
√
2Re [f0f
∗
1 ] exp
[
−(ω
2
0 + ω
2
1 − ω0ω1)
2σ2
]}
−1
. (21)
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Measurements of narrow spectral components using suitable Gaussian filters yield a weak time de-
pendence of the measurement outcomes unlike the previous analysis of strictly monochromatic states
where the probability of the outcome did not depend on time. The corresponding probability density
of the results has the form
p(t)dt ∝ I(t)dt = 2
√
2piσ2 exp
[
−2σ2(t− t0 − L/c)2
]
dt, (22)
from which it follows in particular that the probability of recording by a photodetector in the waiting
mode only tends to unity if the waiting time T exceeds the reciprocal width of the spectrum (T ≥ 1/σ).
This factor is consistent with intuitive ideas on the prolonged recording time of a narrow-band state.
The probability density of the measurement outcomes for the control state has the form
pc(t)dt ∝ I(t)dt = const · 2
√
2piσ2 exp
[
−2σ2(t− t0 − L/c)2
]
×
×
{
|f0|2 + |f1|2 + 2Re (f0f∗1 exp [−i(ω0 − ω1)(t− t0 − L/c)])
}
dt. (23)
The interference oscillating component is well-defined under the condition σ ≪ |ω1 − ω0|.
4. Conclusions
Although various versions of quantum cryptosystems have been proposed, in the author’s view there is
some indeterminacy associated with the following. The evidence of secrecy in quantum cryptography
using two nonorthogonal states proposed in Ref. [3] implies that the states are stationary and belong
to the same energy. Otherwise, for nonstationary states the projectors E0 and E1 would differ at
different times. The nonorthogonality of the stationary states implies that they correspond to the
same energy. Otherwise the stationary states belonging to different energies would automatically be
orthogonal. In this sense, the protocol for the stationary states exists as it were outside time. Attempts
to introduce the time explicitly in the exchange protocol[14, 17] still use reasoning from Ref. [3] for
stationary states as evidence of secrecy (see, for example, Ref. [17]). The stationary state are infinite
in time. A similar situation arises here. Evidence of secrecy for states with infinitely narrow spectral
densities, which are thus infinitely extended in time, is also based on the reasoning given in Ref. [3].
For the case where the state space of the system is infinite-dimensional (described by a continuous
variable), evidence of secrecy of the same degree of rigorousness as in Ref. [3] is not obtained, as far
as we are aware. In this sense, the author takes the view that evidence of secrecy is not obtained for
real-time quantum cryptosystems.
In conclusion, the author is grateful to B. A. Volkov, S. S. Nazin, S. T. Pavlov, and I. I. Tartakovski˘ı
for fruitful discussions. This work was supported by the Russian Fund for Basic Research (Project
No. 96-02-19396).
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Figure 1: Qualitative version of cryptosystem. The signal from a single-photon source is directed to
a “prism” beyond which is a screen which transmits the signal either with the frequency ω0 (logic
zero, upper diaphragm open) or ω1 (logic one, lower diaphragm open), or both frequencies (control
signal, both diaphragms open). At the receiving end the measurement procedure is arranged similarly.
Upper diaphragm open — measurement of E0, lower open — measurement of E1, and both open —
measurement of E(dt). The diaphragms are open or shut during an entire specific message.
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